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Abstract 
 
This chapter argues that copyright’s commodification of creativity has established a 
structure that, allied with aspects of the market for cultural goods and services, 
enables the domination of cultural output by the creative industries.  The chapter 
argues that the primary tools of the commodification process have been the 
alienability of the copyright interest, the long duration of copyright, its horizontal 
expansion, its strong distribution rights, and the apparent demise of some of the most 
significant user rights.  The consequent dominance of the creative industries over 
cultural output has had the effect of contracting the public domain and potentially 
restricting creativity..  The chapter focuses on the question of available legal strategies 
for preserving, or even reclaiming, a portion of the public domain order to address the 
negative effects of the commodification process. 
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Introduction 
 
In recent times the discourse of copyright has become, for better or worse, intimately 
connected with that of the so-called creative industries.  This discourse recognises an 
essential aspect of copyright law, which is that it is focused on stimulating investment 
in the distribution of creative works.  To some extent, this focus has an uneasy 
juxtaposition with copyright’s more general claim to support and encourage creativity 
of the artistic and cultural variety.  Whether or not the aims of supporting creativity 
and supporting investment in distribution are inherently uneasy bedfellows, it seems 
that the current system of international copyright law
1
 has produced effects that tend 
to marginalize individual creativity: the cultural industries have not only spread out 
over most the bed, they are also hogging the blankets. 
 
 
Copyright and Creativity 
 
                                                 
1
 Comprised by the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs 
Agreement) and the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of 1886. 
The threat that the international copyright system poses to creativity, and associated 
values such as cultural diversity,
2
 is a consequence of the process by which it 
commodifies and instrumentalises the cultural outputs with which it is concerned. 
There are five interdependent aspects of copyright law that have been essential to this 
process.
3
  The first and most basic tool of commodification is the alienability of the 
copyright interest.  This is a critical factor in the context of this chapter.  Copyright 
law operates on the basis of a distinction between the author of copyright works and 
the owner of those works.  While the author maintains some symbolic significance in 
copyright law,
4
 the rights conferred by copyright are enjoyed by its owners.  
Sometimes authorship and ownership coincide.  Authors of literary, dramatic, musical 
and artistic works are usually the first owners of the copyright in those works; and 
film directors typically have a share of the copyright interest.
5
  However, at least in 
the Anglo-American system, these interests can be freely transferred by contract.  
Thus, it is frequently the case that authors of copyright works come under pressure to 
transfer their copyright to those who are making an investment in the distribution of 
the works, such as publishers, and music and film production companies.  In other 
words, it is the practice of the creative industries to take advantage of the alienability 
of the copyright interest to gather in as many copyright interests as it can.  Since the 
transfer of copyright interests is a question of contract, the extent to which a publisher 
or production company will be successful in doing this is largely a matter of relative 
bargaining positions and market power.  Nevertheless, where this process of 
“gathering in” is successful, it has the consequence of uniting in the same hands the 
copyright interests in primary creative works and the copyright interests already 
enjoyed by those who invest in the distribution of those same works.
6
 
 
A second significant aspect of copyright law making it an important tool of trade and 
investment is its duration.  The long period of copyright protection increases the asset 
value of individual copyright interests.
7
  Thirdly, copyright’s horizontal expansion 
means that it is progressively covering more and more types of cultural production  
Fourthly, the strong commercial distribution rights,
8
 especially those which give the 
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 As enshrined, eg, in the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Diversity 
2005.  For an account of the overlaps between the concepts of culture with which the UNESCO 
Convention is concerned, and the subject matter of copyright law, see F Macmillan, “The UNESCO 
Convention as a New Incentive to Protect Cultural Diversity”, in H Schneider & P van den Bossche 
(eds), Protection of Cultural Diversity from a European and International Perspective (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2008), 163-192. 
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 For a fuller version of this argument see: F Macmillan, “Copyright and Culture: A Perspective on 
Corporate Power”, (1998) 10 Media and Arts Law Review 71-81; F. Macmillan, “Copyright and 
Corporate Power”, in R Towse (ed), Copyright and the Cultural Industries (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 2002), 99-118; & F Macmillan, “The Cruel ©: Copyright and Film” (2002) 24 European 
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 Eg, duration of copyright in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works is calculated according to 
the life of the author: see, eg, UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 12, & EU Copyright 
Term Directive 93/98/EEC. 
5
 See, eg, UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, s 11. 
6
 Ie. copyright in the sound recording or film, copyright in the typographical arrangement of the 
published edition, copyright in the broadcast. 
7
 See R Towse, “Copyright, Risk and the Artist: An Economic Approach to Policy for Artists” (1999) 6 
Cultural Policy 91-107. 
8
 See esp the WTO TRIPs Agreement, Arts 11 & 14(4), which enshrine rental rights in relation to 
computer programmes, films and phonograms; WIPO Copyright Treaty 1996, Article 7; and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty 1996, Articles 9 & 13. 
copyright holder control over imports and rental rights, have put copyright owners in 
a particularly strong market position, especially in the global context.  Finally, the 
power of the owners of copyright in relation to all those wishing to use copyright 
material has been bolstered by a contraction of some of the most significant user 
rights in relation to copyright works, in particular fair dealing/fair use and public 
interest rights. 
 
Viewed in isolation from the market conditions that characterise the cultural 
industries, copyright’s commodification of cultural output might appear, not only 
benign, but justified by both the need for creators to be remunerated in order to 
encourage them to create
9
 and, in particular, the need for cultural works to be 
disseminated in order to reap the social benefits of their creation.
10
  However, viewed 
in context the picture is somewhat different.  Copyright law has contributed to, 
augmented, or created a range of market features that have resulted in a high degree of 
global concentration in the ownership of intellectual property in cultural goods and 
services.  Five such market features, in particular, stand out.
11
  The first is the 
internationally harmonized nature of the relevant intellectual property rights.
12
  This 
dovetails nicely with the second dominant market feature, which is the multinational 
operation of the corporate actors who acquire these harmonized intellectual property 
rights while at the same time exploiting the boundaries of national law to partition and 
control markets.  The third relevant feature of the market is the high degree of 
horizontal and vertical integration that characterises these corporations.  Their 
horizontal integration gives them control over a range of different types of cultural 
products.  Their vertical integration allows them to control distribution, thanks to the 
strong distribution rights conferred on them by copyright law.
13
  The fourth feature is 
the progressive integration in the ownership of rights over content and the ownership 
of rights over content-carrying technology.  Finally, there is the increasing tendency 
since the 1970s for acquisition and merger in the global market for cultural products 
and services.
14
  Besides being driven by the regular desires (both corporate and 
individual) for capital accumulation,
15
 this last feature has been produced by the 
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that copyright generates little income for most creative artists.  Nevertheless, Towse suggests that 
copyright is valuable to creative artists for reasons of status and control of their work. 
10
 For arguments about the importance of copyright in securing communication of works, see W van 
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388. 
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 For a discussion of the way in which the film entertainment industry conforms to these features, see 
Macmillan, “The Cruel ©”, n 3 supra. 
14
 See R Bettig, Copyrighting Culture: The Political Economy of Intellectual Property (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), at 37ff.  See also J Smiers, “The Abolition of Copyrights: Better for Artists, 
Third World Countries and the Public Domain”, in Copyright and the Cultural Industries, n 3 supra, 
119-139. 
15
 Bettig, n 14 supra, at 37. 
movements towards horizontal and vertical integration, and integration of the 
ownership of rights over content and content-carrying technology. 
 
So far as creativity and cultural diversity are concerned, the consequences of this 
copyright facilitated aggregation of private power over cultural goods and services on 
the global level are not happy ones.  Through their control of markets for cultural 
products the multimedia corporations have acquired the power to act as a cultural 
filter, controlling to some extent what we can see, hear and read.
16
  Closely associated 
with this is the tendency towards homogeneity in the character of available cultural 
products and services.
17
  This tendency, and the commercial context in which it 
occurs, has been well summed up by the comment that a large proportion of the 
recorded music offered for retail sale has “about as much cultural diversity as a 
Macdonald’s menu”.18  It makes good commercial sense in a globalized world to train 
taste along certain reliable routes, and the market for cultural goods and services is no 
different in this respect to any other.
19
  Of course, there is a vast market for cultural 
goods and services and, as a consequence, the volume of production is immense.  
However, it would obviously be a serious mistake to confuse volume with diversity. 
 
The vast corporate control over cultural goods and services also has a constricting 
effect on the vibrancy and creative potential of what has been described as the 
intellectual commons or the intellectual public domain.
20
  As Waldron comments, 
“[t]he private appropriation of the public realm of cultural artifacts restricts and 
controls the moves that can be made therein by the rest of us”.21  The impact on the 
intellectual commons manifests itself in various ways.
22
  For example, private control 
over a wide range of cultural goods and services has an adverse impact on freedom of 
speech.  This is all the more concerning because control over speech by private 
entities is not constrained by the range of legal instruments that have been developed 
in Western democracies to ensure that public or governmental control over speech is 
minimised.
23
  The ability to control speech, arguably objectionable in its own right,
24
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 See further Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate Dominance”, 
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scholarship: see, eg, C Waelde & H MacQueen (eds), Intellectual Property: The Many Faces of the 
Public Domain (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2007). 
21
 J Waldron, “From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property” 
(1993) 69 Chicago-Kent Law Review 841,at 885. 
22
 See further Macmillan, “The Cruel ©”, n 3 supra; Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public 
Domain in an Era of Corporate Dominance”, n 11 supra; & F Macmillan, “Commodification and 
Cultural Ownership” in J Griffiths & U Suthersanen (eds), Copyright and Free Speech: Comparative 
and International Analyses (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 35-65. 
23
 See further F Macmillan Patfield, “Towards a Reconciliation of Copyright and Free Speech”, in E 
Barendt (ed), Yearbook of Media Law and Entertainment Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 199-
233; & Macmillan, “Commodification and Cultural Ownership”, n 22 supra. 
facilitates a form of cultural domination by private interests.  This may, for example, 
take the subtle form of control exercised over the way we construct images of our 
society and ourselves.
25
  But this subtle form of control is reinforced by the industry’s 
overt and aggressive assertion of control over the use of material assumed by most 
people to be in the intellectual commons and, thus, in the public domain.  The irony is 
that the reason people assume such material to be in the commons is that the 
copyright owners have force-fed it to us as receivers of the mass culture disseminated 
by the mass media.  The more powerful the copyright owner the more dominant the 
cultural image, but the more likely that the copyright owner will seek to protect the 
cultural power of the image through copyright enforcement.  The result is that not 
only are individuals not able to use, develop or reflect upon dominant cultural images, 
they are also unable to challenge them by subverting them.
26
  Coombe describes this 
corporate control of the commons as monological and, accordingly, destroying the 
dialogical relationship between the individual and society.
27
  Some remnants of this 
dialogical relationship ought to be preserved by copyright’s fair dealing/fair use right.  
It is, after all, this aspect of copyright law that appears to be intended to permit 
resistance and critique.
28
  Yet the fair dealing defence is a weak tool for this purpose 
and becoming weaker.
29
 
 
 
Protecting the Public Domain 
 
Since the contraction of the public domain is a key aspect of the problem that the 
copyright system poses for creativity, it is important to give some consideration to the 
public domain’s relationship with the propertised domain of copyright law.  The 
juxtaposition, implicated in such a consideration, of the public domain and the 
propertised domain tends to suggest that the metaphorical realm of intellectual space 
is composed of a simple binary opposition,
30
 which divides it between that which is 
subject to private intellectual property rights and that which is not.  The two are 
envisaged as butting up against one another so that, if we were to conceive of this in 
physical terms, each fits snugly against the shape of the other.  More than this, if the 
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 See, eg, the discussion of the justifications for the free speech principle in E Barendt, Freedom of 
Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, 2
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 See, eg, Walt Disney Prods v Air Pirates, 581 F 2d 751 (9
th
 Cir, 1978), cert denied, 439 US 1132 
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 Coombe, n 25 supra, at 86. 
28
 See J Gaines, Contested Culture: The Image, the Voice and the Law (Chapel Hill/London: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991), at 10. 
29
 See further Macmillan, “Public Interest & the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate Dominance”, n 
11 supra. 
30
 E Hemmungs Wirtén, “Out of Sight & Out of Mind: On the Cultural Hegemony of Intellectual 
Property (Critique)” (2005) 20 Cultural Studies 165. 
two also take up the whole of intellectual space, altering the contours of intellectual 
property will alter those of the public domain.  In this sense, there is a tendency to 
imagine the public domain as a largely passive victim of the aggressive presence of 
intellectual property – so that the boundary between the two changes only when 
intellectual property rights expand. 
 
The idea of the public domain in intellectual space is heavily dependent on principles 
of Roman law governing physical space.  Some of the conceptual problems that arose 
with respect to physical space in Roman law have also emerged in the modern notion 
of intellectual space.  At the same time, the metaphorical existence of modern 
intellectual space seems to lack some of the complexity of its forbear in physical 
space.  The relevant Roman law principles recognised various dimensions of 
nonexclusive – but not necessarily public - property.31  The most well-used of these so 
far as intellectual property/public domain debate are concerned are res communes and 
res publicae.  The former referring to things incapable by their nature of being 
exclusively owned, while the latter referring to things open to the public by operation 
of law.  These seem to have translated into the modern day debate about property in 
intellectual space in the specific form of the concepts of the commons and the public 
domain.  The fact that these expressions are often used interchangeably is probably 
not much of a surprise given that the Romans had a similar problem with res 
communes and res publicae,
32
 which reflected the modern day tendency “to mix up 
normative arguments for ‘publicness’ with naturalistic arguments about the 
impossibility of owning certain resources”.33  This confusion between the commons 
and the public domain, res communes and res publicae, has done nothing to simplify 
the epistemological basis of the dichotomy between intellectual property and 
intellectual public space.
34
  More than this, it has tended to conceal the fact that, 
traced back to their Roman law origins, neither of these concepts seems to provide a 
particularly strong basis for a vibrant public or non-exclusive intellectual space in 
today’s world. 
 
So far as res communes is concerned, one might be forgiven for thinking that because 
of the non-rivalrous and non-wasteable nature of things in intellectual space they are 
all incapable by their nature of being exclusively owned or appropriated.
35
  As is well-
known, there has been a tendency for law governing physical space, particularly 
environmental law, to foreclose or regulate the use of the physical commons.  At least 
in some cases, this has been a benevolent response to the famous “tragedy of the 
commons”,36 according to which resources held commonly are plundered, degraded 
and eventually exhausted.
37
  The non-rivalrous and non-wasteable nature of things in 
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 See C M Rose, “Romans, Roads and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public Property in the 
Information Age” (2003) 66 Law & Contemporary Problems 89. 
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 Rose, n 31 supra, at 96, citing A Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law (London: Blackstone, 1994), 
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 Rose, n 31 supra, at 96. 
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 See also Hemmungs Wirtén, n 30 supra, who suggests that it is time for “some good old 
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 See G Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons” (1968) 162 Science 1243, 1244. 
37
 See further, eg, Hardin, n 36 supra; & E Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of 
Institutions or Collective Action (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), esp ch 
1, in which the tragedy of the commons is contrasted with other models of the commons. 
intellectual space tends to suggest that this is not a reason for the foreclosure of 
common intellectual space, but intellectual property law has done it anyway.  Or, at 
least, it has tried to do it.  It may be that there are certain things that not even the 
might of intellectual property law can convert into property capable of exclusive 
ownership in any meaningful sense.  For example, the ease of copying works 
available in digital form allied with the difficulty in identifying and proceeding 
against unauthorised copiers, may be an indication that this part of intellectual space 
is incapable of the type of exclusive ownership enjoyed in relation to other types of 
intangible works.  On the other hand, the combined effect of technology and law may 
render even this part of intellectual space appropriable. 
 
Intellectual property law has not, of course, sought to foreclose all of the intellectual 
commons.  Copyright law, famously, rejects the ownership of ideas, embracing the 
tenuous distinction between the unprotected idea and the protected expression,
38
 
although this concept seems to be unevenly applied
39
 and subject to much erosion.
40
  
More generally, creative acts that do not fall within the realm of copyright law are not 
appropriated.
41
  However, copyright (along with intellectual property rights related to 
it) has been distinguished by a tendency to extend its reach over more and more 
creative or innovative acts in intellectual space.
42
  To the extent that intellectual 
property laws continue to exclude certain parts of intellectual space from the 
propertised domain, it is far from clear whether their exclusion is because they are, by 
their legal nature, incapable of being owned, and therefore part of the commons, or 
because they should not be brought into the private domain of intellectual property 
but should be kept in the public domain.   
 
Arguably, because things in intellectual space are all incapable of ownership in the 
sense that things in physical space may be owned, but are all – or nearly all – quite 
capable of being appropriated in another way by force of law, the concept of the 
commons or res communes is a difficult one to apply to intellectual space.  At least, it 
is difficult once we concede any concept of ownership in intellectual space, unless by 
referring to the commons we merely mean to be descriptive and refer to those things 
that, as a matter of fact, have not been subsumed into the intellectual property regime.  
The concept of the res publicae, where there is the scope for what Rose describes as 
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“normative arguments for ‘publicness’”,43 seems to offer far greater promise.  Unlike 
the concept of res communes, res publicae in physical space does not reject the notion 
of private property.  According to Rose, res publicae is always open to the possibility 
of ownership “subject to the requirements of reasonable public access”.44 
 
In physical space, res publicae is regarded as normatively justified by the need to 
ensure productive synergistic interactions that would otherwise be obstructed by 
denying public access.
45
  The irony in the application of this concept to intellectual 
space is that precisely because things in intellectual space are non-rivalrous and non-
wasteable there are not many reasons why productive synergistic interactions should 
not take place.
46
  That is, there are not many reasons apart from intellectual property 
law itself.  By regarding things in intellectual space as capable of appropriation and 
not therefore res communes, intellectual property law has created a system of 
obstructions to synergistic interactions.  Then, in response to these obstructions, it has 
created its own mechanisms to defend res publicae.  Arguably, this sounds slightly 
more ridiculous than it actually is.  One of the reasons that productive synergistic 
interactions might not take place in unfettered intellectual space is because, in the 
absence of reward, appropriate investment and effort might not be made.  Even 
accepting this argument and accepting that the most appropriate form of “reward” is 
the creation of intellectual property rights,
47
 it seems reasonably clear that to achieve 
productive synergistic interactions there needs to be a carefully calibrated balance 
between property rights in intellectual space and rights that preserve res publicae.  In 
copyright law, this is generally achieved through two mechanisms: limits on duration 
and exceptions to the exercise of the exclusive rights.  With respect to the first 
mechanism, the provisions of the law automatically defend the res publicae, whereas 
in relation to the second those seeking to use the exceptions must make a case.  
Despite the existence of these mechanisms, it would be straining credulity to suggest 
that the balance between property rights and rights that preserve res publicae in 
intellectual space is carefully calibrated.  The history of intellectual property law 
generally, and copyright law specifically, has marked a progressive extension of the 
duration of intellectual property rights and the contraction of their respective 
exceptions and defences. 
 
The duration of copyright has expanded from the initial maximum period of fourteen 
years
48
 to the current high-water mark of ninety years after the death of the author in 
some jurisdictions.  The vitality of its fair dealing exceptions, which are essential to 
permitting the sort of access that allows productive synergistic interactions, has been 
sapped by a combination of restrictive judicial interpretation,
49
 technological 
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innovations, and new legal devices that interact with that technology.
50
  At the same 
time as the Internet has opened up a panoply of apparently free artefacts in intellectual 
space, other forms of digital technology are being used to restrict access to highly 
sought after information.
51
  A further matter that accentuates the lack of balance in the 
copyright regime is the fact that the application of the exceptions is open to 
considerable legal disputation, which frequently means that the deep pockets of large 
corporate rights’ holders are pitted against those of more limited means. 
 
The dominance of res communes and res publicae in informing our notion of the 
public domain as it relates to intellectual property in intellectual space, appear be 
connected to its somewhat impoverished and under-imagined nature.  While there is 
nothing inherently unusual about a lack of imagination, especially in relation to legal 
concepts, its absence here is a little more surprising.  This is because there are two 
further Roman law concepts that could be employed to flesh out the public domain in 
intellectual space.  One of these is res divini juris, referring to things that cannot be 
owned because of their sacred or religious nature.
52
  In the physical realm, ownership 
of things such as temples and icons was offensive to the gods.  One can only speculate 
that offence to the gods would have been caused by general presumptuousness and by 
the fact that the ownership of such property would confer the type of power that might 
rival their own.  At first blush, the application of this category in the context of the 
current debate might not be obvious.  These days we are not necessarily so sensitive 
about the feelings of divine beings, however we still recognise the cultural power of 
the iconic (whether of traditional religious significance or not).  Like the Roman gods, 
if for slightly different reasons, we should be anxious about the idea that such power 
can be exclusively appropriated in intellectual space. 
 
To some extent, copyright law has eschewed exclusive rights in categories of the 
iconic.  Rose suggests, for example, that in intellectual space this category might 
include “the canon, the classics, the ancient works whose long life has contributed to 
their status as rare, extraordinary”.53  Fortunately, the period of copyright duration has 
not yet become so long that we have to worry about the inclusion of these sorts of 
things in propertised intellectual space.  However, Rose goes on to argue: 
[L]est we forget that all things godlike may be accompanied by lesser gods (or 
even false ones) and their representations, we might wish to include here too 
the iconography of modern commercial culture, the Mickeys and Minnies and 
Scarletts … though the point is controversial, the category of res divini juris 
could well embrace this iconography and dedicate it at least in some measure 
to the public, as in copyright law’s exception for parody.54 
                                                                                                                                            
has used a copyright work for the purpose of criticising that work, rather than for the purpose of 
criticising society in general.  On the significance of this case, see further Macmillan, “Corporate 
Power & Copyright” n 3 supra; & Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of 
Corporate Dominance”, n 11 supra. 
50
 The particular device in question is the anti-circumvention right.  For a case that illustrates the 
dangers of this right, see Universal City Studios, Inc v Corley, 273 F 3d 429 (US Ct of Apps (2d Cir), 
2001).  See further, Macmillan, “Public Interest and the Public Domain in an Era of Corporate 
Dominance”, n 11 supra. 
51
 A classic example of this is the dispute over access to electronic journals. 
52
 Rose, n 31 supra, 108-110. 
53
 Rose, n 31 supra, 109. 
54
 Rose, n 31 supra, 109. 
Copyright law certainly could do this, but there is little evidence currently that it 
would. Indeed, Mickey and Minnie have been able to rely on intellectual property law 
to protect them and their cultural baggage from parody.
55
  The exception for parody is 
not well-defined
56
 and, to the extent that it must rely on the fair dealing defences, is 
compromised by their shrinkage. 
 
The final category of non-exclusive property under Roman law that has some 
resonance in the context of the colonising of intellectual space by intellectual property 
is res universitatis.
57
  In modern parlance, this refers to a regime that is bounded by 
property rights, but creates a type of limited public domain (or commons) within its 
boundaries.
58
  In physical space, this merges the advantages of productive synergistic 
interaction with the need to avoid the tragedy of the commons.  In intellectual space, 
as discussed above, there is no need to avoid the tragedy of the commons, so the 
utility of res universitatis, or the bounded commons, must be to preserve productive 
synergies while maintaining the incentive to produce such synergies through the 
exercise of rights against outsiders.  As the name suggests, this type of bounded 
community is commonly reflected in the activities of academic and scholarly 
groupings.
59
  It may also describe the way in which members of traditional and 
indigenous communities produce innovations, knowledge and other types of creative 
expressions.  As this example serves to remind us, intellectual property law has some 
difficulties in recognising these types of creative or innovative communities.
60
  The 
primary reason for this is that intellectual property is always anxious to identify the 
owner of the relevant right.  In doing this, it is likely to disregard many contributions 
from the relevant community and to muddle up concepts of origination, ownership 
and use.
61
  Copyright law does enjoy a very limited ability to recognise the concept of 
the bounded creative or innovative community through the device of joint authorship, 
which it transforms into joint ownership.  However, this concept is so limited in law 
that it can rarely do justice to the dynamic relations of a creative or innovative 
community.
62
  In any case, the successful use of the concept of joint authoriship to 
nourish a vibrant creative or innovative community depends upon an unrealistic 
degree of goodwill, if not goodness, on the part of all the members of the relevant 
community.
63
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Does the public domain really matter so much? 
 
The importance of the various dimensions of the public domain that may be 
analogised to res communes, res publicae, res divini juris and res universitatis lies in 
the extent to which they are capable of rising to the role that the public domain needs 
to play in today’s world.  The reason that the public domain has come to matter so 
much in the debate about intellectual space and its creeping propertisation is not just 
because of some intuitively appealing ideas about the importance of balance between 
it and the propertised domain, it is rather a consequence of the dangers posed by the 
power of those few who hold so much of the really bankable property in intellectual 
space.  Intellectual space is no longer divided between a public domain and a 
propertised zone in which a rich diversity of author-originators each wield exclusive 
rights over a small plot.  To be sure, these people still exist as owners of intellectual 
property rights, but the commodifiable nature of intellectual property rights means 
that vast tracts of prime intellectual space have been bought up by powerful 
multinational corporate interests, the big players of the creative industries.
64
  Here, the 
analogy with physical space similarly held is alarming - and rightly so.  This power, 
which resides to a considerable degree in the hands of concentrated corporate sectors, 
means that its members are able to exert undue control over the direction of 
significant areas of cultural and technical development.
65
  Even more seriously, the 
power that has been acquired by the corporate players, partly although not exclusively 
on the back of intellectual property rights, means that they are able to exert more and 
more control over the shape of intellectual property law itself.
66
 
 
The public domain is the only place in intellectual space in which the power of the 
corporate giants can be challenged and resisted.  One of the reasons why the power of 
the concentrated corporate sectors over intellectual property law is a matter of such 
concern is that intellectual property has a symbiotic relationship with the public 
domain.  That is, it shapes the public domain, which might be conceived of 
alternatively as its progeny, rather than being in a binary opposition to it.  In this lies 
the tragedy of the modern public domain in intellectual space.  If the formation of 
intellectual property law is subject to the power of those who dominate the 
propertised part of intellectual space, then it seems likely that this part will expand 
and the public domain will contract.  As the discussion above has attempted to 
demonstrate, this is exactly what has happened.  Res communes may be weakly 
analogised to that part of the public domain that intellectual property law deems 
incapable (for now) of appropriation.  However, intellectual property law has shown a 
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tendency to deem more and more of what we might have considered res communes as 
capable, after all, of appropriation.  The concept of res publicae in intellectual space, 
which is justified by the importance of productive synergistic interactions, is defended 
(or not) by the variable and constantly changing rules on duration and a progressively 
weakening range of defences and exceptions.   
 
What is perhaps of equal concern to the contraction of these aspects of the public 
domain in intellectual space is that the public domain that has been created by 
intellectual property law seems to have been a rather thin concept compared to the 
multilayered idea of the public domain in Roman law.  The bounded community 
envisaged by res universitatis is poorly catered for in intellectual property, although 
licensing devices may be used to create something that looks rather like the bounded 
creative or innovative community.  Such communities are capable of indirectly tilting 
against the power of the corporate giants by developing an alternative space for 
creativity and innovation, although their ability to form the basis of a direct attack on 
the monolith of corporate power is open to question.  More capable of mounting such 
a direct attack is the concept of res divini juris, which is grounded in the idea that the 
potency of some symbols gives too much power to those who might seek to 
appropriate them.  This idea does not seem to have gained much influence in 
intellectual property law’s construction of the public domain, although it does have 
some atrophying tools that might be used for this purpose. 
 
 
Is that all there is? 
 
A key aspect of the public domain in both intellectual and physical space is that in 
order to have vitality it needs to be defended and nurtured.  It has been argued above 
that in intellectual space, intellectual property law, including copyright law, 
inadequately provides the means for the defence of the public domain.  But, despite 
the imagined binary world of intellectual property, there are other legal tools for the 
regulation and order of activity in intellectual space.  These include, for instance, 
censorship, obscenity and blasphemy laws, defamation, laws governing national 
security, and laws protecting human rights, including the right to free speech.  It 
seems that at least some of these laws have the effect of altering the boundary 
between the public domain and the propertised zone.  For example, there is some 
evidence that courts will refuse to enforce copyright in material that is regarded as 
obscene,
67
 or has been produced contrary to national security obligations.
68
  In these 
sorts of cases it is arguable that artefacts in intellectual space are being forced out of 
the propertised zone and into the public domain, where they will become subject to 
other forms of regulation designed to ensure that the public domain remains an 
orderly and productive one.  Of course, it might be argued that copyright law has 
attempted to internalise considerations of public policy
69
 with the result that it has 
pushed material that transgresses certain norms into the public domain where it may 
be regulated by areas of law more suited to the purpose.  The distinction between 
exactly what is pushed out by intellectual property law and what is pulled out by other 
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areas of law is, however, rather obscure.  And it is not necessarily clear that what 
intellectual property law pushes out into the public domain has a significant degree of 
identity with that which other areas of the law might seek to pull into it. 
 
The relationship between human rights law and intellectual property law is the 
clearest (if anything here is clear) example of an uncertain tussle at the borders of 
propertised intellectual space and the public domain.  Human rights law, or at least 
norms driven by this area of law, seems to knock at the door of the propertised 
domain in intellectual space requesting the release of certain material for limited times 
and purposes.  A primary human rights concern in the context of copyright law relates 
to freedom of speech issues.
70
  In essence, the tension is between the control that the 
copyright owner has over the copyright work and the argument that the work should, 
for certain purposes, subsist in the public domain.   
 
Despite the fact that copyright law grounds a system that might be argued to 
constitute extensive private control over speech, it has shown little concern with 
freedom of speech issues.  The key to copyright law’s comparative inattention to 
countervailing concepts of free speech appears to be threefold.  First, the role of 
copyright in stimulating expressive diversity is often considered to outweigh or 
nullify any negative effects on freedom of speech.
71
  It is accepted that a certain 
degree of copyright protection is necessary for the maintenance of free speech, 
perhaps because it is likely to encourage expressive autonomy and diversity, but at 
least because it is likely to encourage the widespread dissemination of such expressive 
autonomy and diversity.  These are, in turn, prerequisites for the sort of vigorous 
public domain that is essential to maintaining a democratic political and social 
environment, which is the main utilitarian concern of free speech principles.
72
  This 
does not, however, mean that we should be blind to the possibility that under certain 
conditions the way that copyright law restricts activities that might otherwise take 
place in the public domain raises serious freedom of speech concerns.  The second 
reason why copyright has paid little attention to free speech concerns is that there is a 
prevailing belief that copyright has internal mechanisms that are capable of dealing 
with freedom of speech issues, if they arise.  Particular emphasis in this respect is 
placed on the idea/expression dichotomy and the fair dealing defences.  There is no 
doubt that the idea/expression dichotomy is of considerable importance here because 
it prevents the monopolisation of information and ideas that are capable of being 
expressed differently to the way in which they are expressed in the material subject to 
copyright protection.  However, the utility of the dichotomy in relation to non-literary 
copyright material is dubious.
73
  Where the idea/expression dichotomy cannot do the 
job, the fair dealing defences may provide a partial back-up.  But it is only partial: 
despite the potential usefulness of the fair dealing defence for criticism and review, 
the defences are unable to take into much account the most critical factor in relation to 
securing free speech. 
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 The critical factor in securing free speech in a vibrant public domain is not so much 
the question of the extent to which material is subject to property rights, it is rather the 
nature of the rights’ holder and, specifically, the degree of power wielded generally 
by that rights’ holder in intellectual space.  This is linked, in a negative way, to the 
third key to copyright’s inattention to free speech principles, which is that the very 
fact that copyright enables the exercise of private, rather than governmental, control 
over speech means that the risks that copyright poses to free speech are 
underestimated or ignored.  This is despite the fact that a vigorous public domain is as 
much threatened by the concentration in private hands of copyright ownership over 
cultural products as it would be if such ownership was concentrated in the hands of 
the state.  In fact, an argument might even be made that concentration of such 
ownership in private hands is all the more dangerous because at least the state is 
accountable for the way it wields power both through the electoral process and 
through the tools of administrative law.  The private sector is, of course, accountable 
through market mechanisms.  Some questions might be raised about the effectiveness 
of these mechanisms in the case of the media and entertainment corporations, which 
have vast and valuable property rights in intellectual space and hold overwhelming 
power in the market for cultural products.  Since these corporations have acquired the 
ability to shape taste and demand through selective release and other devices for 
cultural filtering, along with the ability to suppress critical speech about the process of 
taste-shaping,
74
 one might conclude that the market mechanism is somewhat 
defective. 
 
 
Conclusion: Re-Drawing the Boundaries 
 
As the foregoing discussion has attempted to demonstrate, while there is a range of 
other laws that regulate intellectual space, only intellectual property has a symbiotic 
relationship with the public domain.  That is, the rights attaching to intellectual 
property shrink and expand conversely with the alterations in the contours of the 
public domain.  Moreover, intellectual property law is largely responsible for drawing 
the boundary between what is subject to property rights, when and how, and what is 
not.  Some (shrinking) parts of intellectual space have been ignored or excluded by 
intellectual property law.  Effectively, in Roman law terms they are for the time being 
something akin to res communes, legally incapable of appropriation.  Doubtless, there 
are also vast swathes of intellectual space that might currently be analogised to the 
Roman law concept of res nullius, the space in which things belong to no-one because 
no appropriation recognised by law has yet taken place.  However, much of 
intellectual space has been colonised by intellectual property.  Within that space, 
intellectual property law itself has declared some things to be in the public domain, 
either for certain limited purposes or by effluxion of time.  Most of what is in the 
public domain for these purposes might be analogised to the concept of res publicae, 
although the current limits to this aspect of the public domain seem to be depriving it 
of much vitality.  Other Roman law concepts of the public domain in physical space, 
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such as res divini juris and res universitatis, seem to have had little impact on the way 
in which intellectual property law creates the public domain in intellectual space. 
 
If intellectual property law not only has a symbiotic relationship with the public 
domain in intellectual space, but also is largely responsible for determining the 
boundary between it and the exercise of exclusive property rights, then an obvious 
way in which to give the public domain more vitality is to alter those aspects of 
intellectual property law that have the most obvious impact on the shape of the public 
domain.  Most obviously, this would involve reversing the current trend whereby 
more and more of intellectual space is sucked into the propertised domain.  For 
copyright law, this would involve limiting if not reversing its tendency to spread 
horizontally to cover new forms of activity in intellectual space, along with a renewed 
commitment to distinguishing between ideas and expressions and keeping the former 
in the intellectual res communes.  Due to doubts about whether the concept of res 
communes can have any meaningful existence in intellectual space, it may be that 
these are really arguments about res publicae in intellectual space.  The line between 
these two concepts, if it exists in intellectual space, is not easy to apply.  What is 
clearer, however, is that the protection of the res publicae in intellectual space 
requires more than just a re-appraisal of the horizontal scope of intellectual property 
laws. 
 
In order to safeguard the vitality of the res publicae in intellectual space so far as it 
relates to copyright, a critical re-appraisal of the duration rules is needed.
75
  In the 
early life of English copyright law, much of the justification for increases in the 
duration of copyright appears to be a manifestation of the influence of romantic 
conceptions of the author and the author’s right to control the work.76  Given that the 
process of commodification divorces the author from his or her work
77
 so that the 
author has become a somewhat marginalised figure in copyright law, extensions of 
the copyright interest based upon the figure of the author seem to have little 
justification.  A similar lack of justification affects the contraction of the defences to 
copyright infringement, especially the fair dealing defences, which are the other 
important aspect of copyright law that needs to be considered if we are to increase the 
protection of res publicae.
78
  Early on in the history of copyright, as a result of the 
focus on the now marginalised figure of the author, there was a transition in the 
application of the fair dealing defences from a focus on what the defendant had added 
to what the defendant had taken.
79
  The contraction of the right has moved forwards in 
leaps and bounds in recent times.  Optimists may argue that subsequent decisions on 
both sides of the Atlantic in cases like Campbell v Acuff-Rose Music, Inc
80
 and Time 
Warner Entertainments Company LP v Channel 4 Television Corporation plc
81
 repair 
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or mitigate some of the damage that Rogers v Koons
82
 has done to the vitality of the 
fair dealing/fair use defence as a weapon for securing the intellectual commons.  
However, the more likely result of this mish-mash of case law is to create confusion 
about the scope of the defence. 
 
So far as those parts of the public domain analogous to the concepts of res divini juris 
and res universitatis are concerned, as has been argued above, they hardly rate any 
recognition in the current organization of intellectual space.  There is potential for 
productive synergies in res universitatis, but in the current climate of corporate 
domination too much valuable intellectual space has already been acquired by 
interests hostile to the type of closed creative or innovative communities that it 
envisages.  A modern version of res divini juris might very well take its place 
alongside a re-invigorated res publicae in order to ensure that the power that might 
otherwise flow from concentrations of ownership in intellectual space do not give rise 
to at least some types of unacceptable abuses or limitations on the rights of others.  
However, even if all the different aspects of the public domain could be catered for 
using expanded versions of the devices that intellectual property currently uses, the 
question of the adequacy of these devices would remain.  Other ways of drawing 
material out into the public domain of intellectual space may also be needed.  At 
present the most obvious tools for this lie within the realms of human rights law.  This 
area of law does not yet seem to have adapted itself for this purpose, although its 
adaptation remains a viable option.  What is arguably important in any future 
development of this kind is that the relevant aspects of human rights law are not 
subsumed into intellectual property law.  The inevitable result of such subsumption 
will be the subjugation of human rights to the essentialism of the property paradigm.  
Human rights will then go the way of all the other exceptions to intellectual property 
law designed to maintain the public domain.  Rather, to be effective in manipulating 
the border of propertised zone and the public domain in intellectual space, human 
rights law needs to maintain its own integrity as an area of law in potential normative 
clash with intellectual property law. 
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